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Medical Malpractice and Black-Box Medicine
W. Nicholson Price II*
20.1 introduction
The explosive proliferation of health data has combined with the rapid develop-
ment of machine-learning algorithms to enable a new form of medicine: “black-box
medicine.”1 In this phenomenon, algorithms troll through tremendous databases of
health data to find patterns that can be used to guide care, whether by predicting
unknown patient risks, selecting the right drug, suggesting a new use of an old drug,
or triaging patients to preserve health resources. These decisions differ from previous
data-based decisions because black-box medicine is, by its nature, opaque; that is,
the bases for black-box decisions are unknown and unknowable.
Black-box medicine raises a number of legal questions, ranging from how to shape
incentives for its development to how to regulate its growth and quality.2 One key
question is how black-box medicine will influence the medical malpractice liability
of healthcare providers. How should tort liability apply to providers who cannot
know the mechanistic underpinnings of the treatment they recommend? Must they
learn as much as they can about the way algorithms are developed and verified?
Or can they rely on the assurances of the developer without more knowledge?
This chapter explores the medical malpractice implications of black-box medi-
cine. It briefly introduces the phenomenon and then considers how the tort system
does, can, and should regulate the behavior of providers and healthcare facilities
using black-box medical techniques. It concludes that while providers and facilities
are ill suited to evaluate the substantive accuracy of black-box medical algorithms,
* Many thanks to Nicholas Bagley, Ana Bracic, Sherman Clark, Rebecca Eisenberg, Roger Ford,
Jessica Litman, Margo Schlanger, Kayte Spector-Bagdady, and Effy Vayena for helpful conver-
sations and advice. All errors are my own.
1 For a detailed description of black-box medicine, see W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box
Medicine, 28 Harv. J.L. Technol. 419 (2015).
2 See W. Nicholson Price II, Big Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine, 37 Cardozo L. Rev.
1401 (2016).
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they could and perhaps should be required to exercise due care to evaluate proced-
ural quality – the expertise of the developer and the availability of independent
external validation – when implementing black-box algorithms in a healthcare
facility or using them to care for patients.
20.2 black-box medicine
Black-box medicine is a response to the immense complexity of biological rela-
tionships. Although we are constantly developing tools to plumb that complexity,
our explicit understanding of those biological relationships is necessarily slow to
develop. Putting our understanding of complex relationships into medical practice
is similarly slow and cumbersome because clinical trials and traditional drug
development take many years and cost hundreds of millions of dollars.
Black-box medicine seeks to exploit the tremendous amount of data being
generated in healthcare to find and use these underlying relationships even without
understanding them and without undergoing the expense and delay of clinical
trials. Health data are proliferating rapidly and becoming newly accessible. Clinical
records, long kept on paper in doctors’ offices, are shifting to electronic form, as
are pharmacy records and medical test results.3 Newer systemic analyses, especially
genomic sequencing, are creating large volumes of patient-specific data. These data
can be combined into individual, group, or population-wide collections, whether
by insurers, provider networks, or government entities like the United States’ newly
formed $215 million Precision Medicine Initiative.4
These collections of data can be used to test and develop explicit hypotheses
about the biology of the body and medical implications. But the data also contain
patterns that are too complex or concealed for such explicit hypothesis testing.
Machine-learning algorithms, using approaches such as deep learning and neural
networks, can find that sort of complex underlying pattern in the data – but cannot
explain or even state what those patterns are.5 Just as Facebook’s DeepFace algo-
rithm can match faces in a set of digital images without explicitly classifying the
features it uses for recognition,6 medical algorithms can (for instance) predict tumor
3 Julia Adler-Milstein et al., Electronic Health Record Adoption in US Hospitals: Progress
Continues, But Challenges Persist, 34 Health Affairs (published online November 2015),
available at https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/abs/10.1377/hlthaff.2015.0992 [https://perma.cc/
6RQZ-LTW4].
4 Francis S. Collins & Harold Varmus, A New Initiative on Precision Medicine, 372 N. Engl.
J. Med. 793 (2015).
5 See Joseph A. Cruz & David S. Wishart, Applications of Machine Learning in Cancer
Prediction and Prognosis, 2 Cancer Inform. 59 (2007).
6 DeepFace: Closing the Gap to Human-Level Performance in Face Verification, Research at
Facebook (June 24, 2014), available at https://research.facebook.com/publications/48056722537
6225/deepface-closing-the-gap-to-human-level-performance-in-face-verification/ [https://perma
.cc/TNT3-JSUR].
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response to a particular drug based on allelic patterns among thousands of genes or
predict lung cancer prognosis by analyzing microscopic images7 – all without
understanding or identifying why or how those patterns matter.8 This opacity is
not deliberate, though some secrecy by developers could compound it.9 Instead,
the opacity is unavoidable. Sometimes patterns are opaque because they are too
complicated; that is, even if the computer could state the set of, for example, thou-
sands of genes and interacting patient-history factors, we could not understand it.
Other times the opacity is a result of the machine-learning techniques used to find
patterns; a trained neural network (one such technique) typically cannot output
the artificial neurons’ “connections” in any meaningful sense and thus does not
demonstrate how it reached its result. To be clear, this opacity is also not desirable; it
would be preferable to know and understand the relationships being used. And there
are some machine-learning methods that are more transparent. But opaque black-
box methods open up for use a broad swath of nuanced biological patterns currently
too complex or hidden for explicit understanding and are the focus of this chapter.
Black-box medicine accordingly has tremendous potential benefits. Most import-
ant for the context of this chapter, it can direct care, predicting a patient’s risk
profile, helping choose between a selection of known interventions, or suggesting an
off-label use of an approved intervention. A doctor might feed the genetic sequence
of a patient’s tumor into a black-box algorithm, for instance, and receive a recommen-
dation as to what drug is most likely to treat the tumor effectively.10 Alternatively, an
opaque algorithm could continuously evaluate a trauma patient’s electronic vital
signs and sound an alarm at the earliest sign of trouble, perhaps even before trained
providers could observe the need.11 Black-box medicine can also be used to allocate
scarce healthcare resources by suggesting which patient might benefit most from
an organ transplant, a hospital bed, or the attention of the first available healthcare
provider.12 In addition, black-box medicine could potentially generate hypotheses
for traditional biomedical research that might eventually uncover and understand
the underlying mechanisms; that is, the box need not stay black forever. While all
7 Kun-Hsing Yu et al., Predicting Non-Small Cell Lung Cancer Prognosis by Fully Automated
Microscopic Pathology Image Features, 7 Nat. Commun. 12474 (2016).
8 See, e.g., Hojin Moon et al., Ensemble Methods for Classification of Patients for Personalized
Medicine with High-Dimensional Data, 41 Artificial Intelligence Med. 197 (2007).
9 For a description of deliberately secret algorithms, see Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society:
The Secret Algorithms That Control Money and Information (2015).
10 See Moon et al., Moon et al., Ensemble Methods for Classification of Patients for Personalized
Medicine; Michael P. Menden et al., Machine Learning Prediction of Cancer Cell Sensitivity
to Drugs Based on Genomic and Chemical Properties, 8 PLoS ONE e61318 (2013).
11 See Nehemiah T. Liu et al., Development and Validation of a Machine Learning Algorithm
and Hybrid System to Predict the Need for Life-Saving Interventions in Trauma Patients, 52
Med. Biol. Eng. Comput. 193 (2014).
12 See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen et al., The Legal and Ethical Concerns that Arise from Using
Complex Predictive Analytics in Health Care, 33 Health Affairs 1139 (2014).
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these possibilities are significant, this chapter focuses on the first: using black-box
medicine to direct patient care.
As black-box medicine becomes increasingly capable of predicting patient out-
comes and suggesting interventions, it will – and should – become an important part
of patient care. Among many implementation issues, a key question for healthcare
providers and facilities is the legal obligation of a provider or facility under the
standards of medical malpractice. What must providers and facilities legally know
and do when practicing black-box medicine?
20.3 liability for the use of opaque medical algorithms
Medical liability law, like tort law in general, typically serves at least two purposes:
first, to compensate injured parties for their injuries and, second, to deter unreason-
ably dangerous behavior. To accomplish these goals, injured patients may recover
from providers who provided substandard care. Patients may also sometimes recover
from the healthcare enterprises involved in the provision of care, including hospitals
and clinics, either vicariously based on the actions of the relevant professional or
directly based on the enterprise’s own duties to the patient.
Negligence actions are not the only possibility for patient recovery. In other
contexts, patients can recover under a strict liability theory for injuries arising from
products that are defective due to manufacturing defects, design defects, or failure to
warn of risks. However, neither healthcare providers nor healthcare facilities are
typically held strictly liable for defects in the products they provide, sell, or use.13
Such cases might be brought against black-box medicine developers.14 Patients may
13 See Hollander v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193, 1217, n. 22 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[A]n
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions have refused to apply strict liability principles to claims
against hospitals and physicians involving the distribution of allegedly dangerous drugs or
medical devices”); see also Randolph A. Miller & Sarah M. Miller, Legal and Regulatory
Issues Related to the Use of Clinical Software in Health Care Delivery, in Clinical Decision
Support 423, 426 (Robert A. Greenes, ed., 2007) (arguing against the application of strict
products liability for clinical decision-support software to providers and hospitals).
14 Potential liability for black-box medical algorithm developers could be conceived of under a
product liability framework, typically based on strict liability – that is, liability for injury without
any determination of fault. However, such liability is complicated by several doctrines, includ-
ing the learned intermediary doctrine (limiting recovery against manufacturers where doctors
prescribe drugs or devices to patients; see Timothy Hall, Reimagining the Learned Intermedi-
ary Rule for the New Pharmaceutical Marketplace, 35 Seton Hall L. Rev. [2005]); for the long-
time immunity of software to product liability suits, see Frances E. Zollers et al., No More Soft
Landings for Software: Liability for Defects in an Industry that Has Come of Age, 21 Santa
Clara Computer High Tech. L. J. 745 (2004); to see whether software is properly classified
as a good or a service, see Michael D. Scott, Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software:
Has the Time Finally Come, 67 Md. L. Rev. 425, 436–42 (2007); for the difficulty of proving
causation and the possibility of preemption by regulatory regimes, see Riegel v. Medtronic, 552
U.S. 312, 330 (2008) (finding preemption of common-law tort claims against makers of medical
devices requiring FDA preapproval).
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also recover from providers who fail to obtain informed consent before undertaking
a treatment that results in the patient’s injury.15 Both of these complex situations are
outside the scope of this chapter, which focuses on malpractice liability against
providers and against healthcare enterprises.
20.3.1 Medical Malpractice by Providers
Jurisdictions vary, but in general, providers must treat patients with due expertise and
care. Typically, this means that the provider must provide the level of care that
would be expected of relevant members of the profession. In most jurisdictions,
courts insist on a national reference group for this comparison; in a minority, a
provider is held, instead, to the level of care offered by those practicing in the same
locality.16 The care required may be modified based on the provider’s specialized
credentials or on the facilities available to the provider; a physician practicing in a
small rural hospital will not be required to use the same specialized equipment
available to the most well-resourced urban medical centers. Hornbook law is that
adhering to customary practice will typically shield a provider from liability. The
reality is more complicated, however; one observer has noted that “judicial defer-
ence to physician customs is eroding. Gradually, quietly and relentlessly, state courts
are withdrawing this legal privilege.”17 Moreover, what tort law requires can be
explicitly modified, for instance, to encompass a certain type of care or to immu-
nize provision of some type of care from liability regardless of common medical
15 Black-box medicine raises nuanced informed-consent issues. At an intuitive level, it is hard to
imagine precisely what “informed” means in the context of a recommendation where no one
knows exactly how it works. But informed consent aims to facilitate treatment decisions made
in the context of a relationship between the trained doctor and the lay patient and recognizes
that many things need not be disclosed. Providers must disclose to the patient information that
a reasonable provider (in some jurisdictions) or a reasonable patient (in others) would find
material and must give the patient a choice about accepting the treatment. See Jaime S. King
& Benjamin Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The Case for Shared Medical Decision-
Making, 32 Am. J.L. Med. 429, 493–501 (2006) (appendix) (finding that about half of the United
States follows a patient-based standard, about half a physician-based standard, and two a hybrid
standard); see also Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972) (rejecting a
physician-based standard and developing a patient-based standard). It is entirely possible that
in most circumstances neither a reasonable provider nor a reasonable patient would find
information about black-box medicine’s development or opacity material to disclose, just as
patients need not be informed about the strength of clinical trial evidence for most interven-
tions recommended today.
16 See Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So.2d 856 (Miss. 1985) (discussing the locality-based standard of care
and adopting a modified nationally based standard of care); Michelle H. Lewis et al., The
Locality Rule and the Physician’s Dilemma: Local Medical Practices vs. the National Standard
of Care, 297 JAMA 2633, 2635 (2007) (tallying which states follow various versions of the
locality rule).
17 Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the
Millennium, 57 Wash. Lee L. Rev. 163, 164 (2000).
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practice.18 In outlier cases, judges have held that failure to provide a specific type of
care, even if uncommon, is tortious.19
Providers thus could be held liable for harmful use of black-box medical algo-
rithms depending on the prevailing customary practice and the extent that custom is
considered dispositive. As with medical innovation more generally, there is a risk of
liability during this transition phase,20 which presents an opportunity to consider
how tort law might encourage the most beneficial medical practices.
The closest useful analogy is clinical decision-support software, designed to help
providers diagnose and treat patients.21This software can, for instance, provide relevant
patient information, collate test results, and suggest diagnoses or treatments based on
well-known explicit relationships. Clinical decision-support software has been ana-
lyzed as an aid to physicians exercising independent judgment when directing care;
it merely “augments the physician’s existing knowledge by providing further infor-
mation.”22 Under this logic, a trained provider should be subject to the exact same
standard of negligence irrespective of whether clinical decision-support software is
used because any treatment decisions are ultimately his or her own. Software provides
information, but the knowledgeable provider intervenes to make the final choice.
This knowledgeable intervention, however, is precisely what is different about
black-box medicine. Because neither providers nor developers know the relation-
ships underlying the recommendations of black-box medicine, the physician cannot
stand as merely the final step in a sequence of care. Once he or she has decided to
use a particular black-box algorithm – itself a complex choice23 – he or she cannot
understand and thus verify the algorithm’s recommendation against his or her
body of substantive expertise; the physician can only accept what the algorithm
18 See, e.g., 18 Vt. Stat. § 5281 (immunizing physicians for civil liability for prescribing life-ending
medication in compliance with certain statutory provisions).
19 See Helling v. Carey, 83 Wn.2d 514 (Wash. 1974) (holding that ophthalmologists must test for
glaucoma in patients under age forty as well as those over age forty, although under-forty testing
was not common practice). On the impact of Helling, which was controversial and soon
countermanded by state statute, see Jerry Wiley, The Impact of Judicial Decisions on Profes-
sional Conduct: An Empirical Study, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 345 (1982).
20 See Anna B. Laakmann, When Should Physicians Be Liable for Innovation?, 36 Cardozo
L. Rev. 913 (2015).
21 See Miller & Miller, Legal and Regulatory Issues Related to the Use of Clinical Software in
Health Care Delivery, at 424.
22 Ibid., at 433; see also Randolph A. Miller, Kenneth F. Schaffner, & Alan Meisel, Ethical and
Legal Issues Related to the Use of Computer Programs in Clinical Medicine, 127 Ann. Intern.
Med. 842 (1985).
23 A physician might choose an algorithm based on the recommendations of a professional
society, the scholarly literature, or the choices of his or her hospital, as discussed below. The
mechanics of approving, validating, ranking, and selecting black-box algorithms are outside the
scope of this chapter. For an exploration of these issues, see Roger A. Ford & W. Nicholson
Price II, Privacy and Accountability in Black-Box Medicine, 22 Mich. Telecomm. Tech. L. Rev.
1 (2016); W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 Mich. L. Rev. 421 (2017).
300 W. Nicholson Price II
terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108147972.027
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Michigan Law Library, on 01 Oct 2021 at 13:36:39, subject to the Cambridge Core
recommends or not. In some instances, this is unlikely to make a difference: where
black-box algorithms suggest an increased risk to be managed with closer monitoring,
the provider’s actions take over from there. But where black-box algorithms suggest
taking an unrelated drug based on previously unknown secondary effects or chang-
ing a drug’s dosage or schedule without conforming to existing medical knowledge,
the resulting care is fundamentally different from care not directed by black-box
algorithms. Imposing the same standard of negligence would make little sense.
So what should medical malpractice law require of providers? Ordinarily, med-
ical malpractice law responds to medical practices developed by providers (although
the law may indirectly shape those practices). As long as a set of reasonable providers
follows a certain practice, that practice will not typically lead to liability.
But when a practice is too innovative to have many adherents, it runs significant
liability risk. Such is the situation of black-box medicine. So right now, in this period
of early development, legislative action and practice guidelines set by professional
organizations could be particularly influential.24 These types of interventions could
incorporate different levels of skepticism associated with the severity of different
interventions.25 For minimal-risk interventions, such as otherwise unindicated test-
ing, increased monitoring, or taking widely used low-side-effect drugs such as aspirin,
the standard of care might require no particular inquiry of the recommendations
of a black-box algorithm. For riskier interventions, such as taking higher doses of a
powerful drug or avoiding such a course when otherwise suggested, providers might
require some validation before relying on a black-box algorithm. The form of
validation would differ from traditional evidence because it would likely need to
be based on procedural checks or independent computation by third parties, not
clinical trials.26 Professional societies, the FDA, and other intermediaries might
serve a role in that validation to make it more feasible for an individual physician
to reasonably check an algorithm’s quality.27 Such a process suggests the exercise of
24 See Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. Penn. L. Rev. 645 (2001).
25 This structure parallels the risk-based framework the FDA applies to preapproval for medical
devices; low-risk devices are subject only to agency notification, high-risk devices to rigorous
clinical trials, and intermediate-risk devices to an intermediate standard of evidence. See, e.g.,
Aaron V. Kaplan et al., Medical Device Development from Prototype to Regulatory Approval,
109 Circulation 3068 (2004). Ex ante classification raises its own challenges, including who
would classify the devices. See, e.g., “Software as a Medical Device”: Possible Framework for
Risk Categorization and Corresponding Considerations, International Medical Device Regula-
tors Forum 13–15 (September 18, 2014), available at www.imdrf.org/docs/imdrf/final/technical/
imdrf-tech-140918-samd-framework-risk-categorization-141013.pdf [https://perma.cc/GK54-UGVB]
(describing potential risk classification of software). Ex post classification, whether tiered or not,
raises risks of chilling physician adoption.
26 See Price, Black-Box Medicine, at 440–42 (discussing computational validation of black-box
medicine).
27 See Price, Regulating Black-Box Medicine (discussing potential roles for the FDA and collab-
orating healthcare actors in validating black-box algorithms).
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intervening procedural judgment, even if substantive judgment is impossible. In
somewhat analogous situations, courts have been willing to treat the use of an
outdated information source as evidence of substandard care.28 For the riskiest
and most counterintuitive interventions – for instance, prescribing high doses of
thalidomide to a pregnant woman – it is possible that under current standards, no
black-box verification could be strong enough to overcome the presumption of harm
under a reasonable standard of care. Such validation and reliability concerns could
also be incorporated into potential liability for choosing a poor-quality algorithm
against, for instance, the recommendations of a professional society.
Using a risk-based approach to evaluate the recommendations of black-box
medicine brings with it challenges of implementation, overcaution, and under-
compensation. First, a risk-based approach might be hard to implement efficiently,
requiring expert testimony about the appropriate level of procedural assurance
required for a particular intervention’s risk. This real concern is, unfortunately, an
unavoidable aspect of defining negligence based on a practitioner-based standard
of care. Demonstrating adequate procedural care does not on its face appear to
raise substantially greater evidentiary challenges than substantive standards for non-
black-box care.
Second, providers might be too cautious, avoiding beneficial interventions out of
concern for potential liability. This concern is true about new medical interventions
in general, but to the extent that opaque algorithms seem to have a higher risk of
causing harm, it may be more salient. Notably, however, some of the limited work
done on diagnostic aids suggests that juries are less likely to punish doctors who act
in accordance with such aids29; similar patterns might occur for black-box medicine,
easing adoption. Eventually, liability concerns might actually help drive adoption as
black-box medicine graduates from its current status of untested innovation, becom-
ing sufficiently prevalent to get the protection of the ordinary medical malpractice
deference rules or even sufficiently dominant that nonadherence is deemed unrea-
sonable. Like other medical advances, once black-box medicine becomes a more
routine and better-accepted tool for medical care, providers not incorporating it
could be liable for negligence if patients sustain reasonably avoidable injuries.30
Third and finally, a risk-based standard of care might undercompensate patients
if observing failures to follow the standard of care were particularly difficult. In
medical malpractice in general, identifying errors and demonstrating causation raise
28 See, e.g., Boswer v. Craig Ranch Emergency Hosp., No. 05-14-00501-CV, 2015 WL 3946371, at
*4–5 (Tex. App. Jun. 29, 2015) (finding that a hospital’s use of an outdated textbook to establish
its policy could imply a “failure to promulgate policies and procedures regarding the standard
of care”).
29 Hal R. Arks et al., The Influence of a Physician’s Use of a Diagnostic Decision Aid on the
Malpractice Verdicts of Mock Jurors, 28 Med. Decision Making 201, 204–5 (2008).
30 See Miller & Miller, Legal and Regulatory Issues Related to the Use of Clinical Software in
Health Care Delivery, at 346 (making a similar argument in the context of clinical decision
support software).
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substantial challenges. Observing failures to evaluate the riskiness of a black-box
algorithm’s recommendation might be similarly challenging. However, limited
observability and compensation are a long-term reality of medical malpractice in
any context, not just black-box medicine.
In sum, liability for providers using black-box medicine is both familiar and quite
novel, like black-box medicine itself. Providers will typically be held to the level of
care of other comparable providers, which will develop over time as black-box
medicine enters care. However, choices might best be shaped – judicially, legisla-
tively, or professionally – to rely on risk-based procedural validation as the touch-
stone for practice and liability because the underlying physiologic cause of injury
will be both unavoidably opaque and unevaluable by the expertise of the provider.
20.3.2 Liability of Healthcare Enterprises
In addition to providers, larger healthcare enterprises such as hospitals and clinics
owe a duty of care to patients, especially in modern medical settings involving
coordination of complex care. Hospitals may be vicariously liable for the negligence
of healthcare providers who are actual or apparent agents of the enterprise but may
also have duties directly to patients that are especially relevant for black-box medi-
cine. In particular, hospitals have been held to have a duty to provide adequate
facilities for patient care, including well-functioning equipment necessary for
adequate care.31 In some jurisdictions, hospitals have other direct duties to patients,
including a duty to coordinate care and sometimes a nondelegable duty to actually
provide care for patients.32
Under these theories, hospitals could be liable for negligently choosing, imple-
menting, and using black-box medical systems. As with liability for providers,
hospitals are typically held to the standard of a reasonable hospital; also as with
providers, this means that a hospital’s responsibilities can evolve as industry custom
does. But policymakers could try to move hospitals’ standard of care for imple-
menting black-box algorithms toward one that would involve procedural tools to
make sure that algorithms are well validated and competently developed before
implementation.
Although hospitals are typically not liable for defects in the products they pro-
vide and/or sell, they may have a duty to nonnegligently evaluate the quality of
those products and may be liable for failures of products that they fail to evaluate.33
31 See Washington v. Washington Hospital Center, 579 A.2d 177 (D.C. Ct. App. 1990) (finding
that a hospital could be directly liable for failure to provide carbon dioxide monitors in
operating rooms).
32 See Thompson v. Nason Hospital, 427 Pa. 330 (Penn. 1991).
33 See Parker v. St. Vincent Hospital, 122 N.M. 39, (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that a hospital is
not strictly liable for defects in a physician-selected implant but acknowledging potential
liability for negligently failing to examine the safety of the implant before provision).
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Thus hospitals might reasonably be held liable for failing to ensure that the
algorithms they make available to providers and patients are, as a whole, high quality
and safe. Because substantive validation may be impossible in many cases – given
the opaque nature of black-box medicine – procedural validation could be required
instead. Parallels could be drawn to a more familiar responsibility of hospitals: their
requirement to adequately credential the physicians who work in them to ensure
that patients are seen by high-quality, well-trained doctors.34 While a hospital cannot
ensure that each decision of its doctors is correct, it can ensure that the doctors it
brings through its doors are reasonably proficient. Applying a similar duty to black-
box medicine would recognize the inherent opacity of the technology while leaving
some responsibility on hospitals to take care in selection and implementation.35
20.4 recommendations and conclusions
The development and adoption of black-box medicine are complex processes that
will naturally evolve over time. But black-box medicine is coming fast. Knowing the
risks of legal liability under current law is important, but perhaps more important is
the opportunity to shape that liability as black-box medicine becomes increasingly
powerful and prevalent. Liability for the developers of black-box medicine is import-
ant and complicated and demands careful study to set incentives for development
and validation. But providers and healthcare facilities will be the crucial frontline of
black-box medicine, choosing and implementing algorithms and interfacing directly
with patients. Correct liability rules for providers and facilities could help to ensure
that they will exercise due care in that task; they could also direct compensation for
patients injured by the absence of such care.
Setting the right standards of liability for providers and facilities may require more
than just waiting for the professions to eventually evolve the proper standard of care.
To reiterate, the baseline grounding of the standard of care in customary practice
privileges hewing to tradition and may therefore slow the adoption of new technolo-
gies. Deliberate standard setting could provide a different path. This is not to suggest
that deliberate standard setting is especially likely to occur; the shield of deference
to customary practice has deep roots. But it remains worth considering whether
medical malpractice could have a role in the responsible adoption of black-box
medical algorithms and what that might look like.
Standards must tread a careful middle ground between two extremes. On the
one hand, overly lax liability rules could result in potentially haphazard application
of new algorithms that may be insufficiently validated. While this might speed
34 See Torin A. Dorros & T. Howard Stone, Implications of Negligent Selection and Retention of
Physicians in the Age of ERISA, 21 Am. J.L. Med. 383, 396–97 (1995).
35 Hospitals could also potentially be involved in developing their own black-box algorithms, as
custodians of substantial amounts of patient data. In such circumstances, they would poten-
tially incur liability as algorithm developers, a topic outside the scope of this chapter.
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adoption of black-box medicine, it could also insufficiently protect patients and
would create fewer incentives for algorithm developers to demonstrate the quality
of their products. On the other hand, overly stringent liability rules, such as strict
liability for providers or facilities for injuries or requirements that they comprehend
the inherently incomprehensible mechanisms of black-box algorithms, would stymie
adoption and the benefits that black-box medicine could bring.
A potentially workable middle ground would require providers and facilities to
exercise due care in procedurally evaluating and implementing black-box algo-
rithms. Providers and facilities should evaluate black-box algorithms for hallmarks
of careful development, including independent validation of algorithmic results and
the qualifications of the developers. Facilities are best suited to evaluate algorithms
at the point of implementation and should ensure that algorithms – as a whole – are
high quality according to measurable characteristics. Providers are able to measure
the risk associated with a particular intervention and should accordingly measure
the level of validation and confidence against the risks entailed. Such a duty would
help facilitate the development of independent private or regulatory mechanisms
for developing and providing that type of validation.36 Finally, these duties or indi-
vidual determinations should not remain static; black-box medicine will develop
and evolve rapidly, and the appropriate role for providers and healthcare facilities
should evolve with it.
36 See Price, Black-Box Medicine, at 457–62.
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